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Introduction 
The inauguration of the Scottish Parliament (SP) was derived, in part, from widespread concern that existing institutions did not facilitate effective scrutiny of Scottish government or, indeed, third and private sector organisations (Mitchell, 2009). Devolution was reflective, therefore, of the view that there was a democratic deficit (Flinders, 2008) in Scotland.  This article addresses this issue through an assessment of scrutiny undertaken through departmentally-orientated subject committees during the third Scottish Parliament (SP). This emphasis reflects core scrutiny functions of similar committees in parliaments-assemblies within and beyond the UK (Drewry, 1985;  Zajc, 2007). 

There are two distinctive research objectives. First, to enhance scholarship about SP committee scrutiny. Second, to develop theoretical explanations in terms of bi-constitutionalism and thus specify learning that could be applied to committee scrutiny elsewhere. 

Committee Scrutiny  
Scholarship about the UK House of Commons has long assessed the operation of such committees through scrutiny (Morris, 1970). In this context, ‘scrutiny’ described processes and procedures of committees, consisting of elected non-executive politicians, directed towards assessing the performance and policy agendas of elected executive politicians, public sector bureaucrats and other influential individuals.  

Committee operations often incorporate implicit objectives of bi-partisanship, specifically the assumption that achievements require consensus amongst a diversity of elected politicians. The prime exception concerns line-by-line ‘committee stage’ legislative scrutiny, where behaviour typically matches the partisan quasi-ritualism of plenary sessions. The distinctive nature of these formal line-by-line ‘committee stage’ debates means, however, that this aspect is excluded from the study, despite being undertaken by committees with a much wider scrutiny brief in Scotland and elsewhere. Here, analysis of committee scrutiny is addressed through four phases – choice (selection of topics and personnel); evidence-gathering (acquiring evidence),  evaluation (assessing evidence) and outputs (publication of reports and recommendations).

Choice
There are two aspects – topics and personnel. Assessment of topics is deconstructed into three themes. First, whether institutions have the political atmosphere or committee infrastructure to produce a recurrent and significant stream of substantive scrutiny.  In particular, there have been favourable judgements about the operational structure at the UK House of Commons since 1979 (Norton, 2005), in spite of scale and scope deficiencies concerning aspects such as public expenditure (Ryle, 1997).  This theme has been also addressed in relation to other countries, for example Verma (1986) highlighted impact arising from the significant configuration of advisory committees in India. Second, do committees have discretion to construct their own agendas?  Substantial freedom for committees in countries like the UK (Drewry, 1985) and Israel (Hazan, 2001) can be compared with significant restrictions elsewhere; particularly concerning legislative scrutiny requirements, for example in Japan (Oyama, 2003).  

Third, the degree to which the issues discussed were reflective of imperatives to avoid splits which, it was assumed, would undermine credibility (Robinson, 1985). This restriction was important at the UK House of Commons; inquiries overwhelmingly emphasised questions away from the epicentre of party political debate (Rogers and Walters, 2004). 

The role-power of party managers in selecting committee membership, which (of course) affected the freedom of committee members to challenge leadership agendas and policies (Strom, 1998), was the central personnel theme. Such a party-patronage appointments model has been identified as widespread among parliaments and assemblies, for example in Hungary (Ilonski, 2007). 

At the UK House of Commons, party whips traditionally controlled select committee appointments, patronage which enabled them to exert wider influence over the behaviour of MPs. As Rush and Giddings (2011: 188) observed, independently-minded MPs might find ‘their would-be membership of select committees treated less sympathetically’. This position was, however, transformed in spring 2010, when secret-ballot elections occurred for chairs and members. This reform has already been credited with positive impacts. For example, through ‘reinforcing their (select committees) credibility and authority’ (HC 82, 2013: 8), particularly concerning a much ‘higher public profile’ (HC 82, 2013: 8). It has also been argued that this reform has generated a greater inclination to undertake, as Professor Patrick Dunleavy noted in evidence to a Political and Constitutional Reform Committee inquiry, ‘very major investigative tasks that in the past might have been wholly contracted out by the Executive to a judge or inquiry or whatever’ (HC 82, 2013: 9). 

Evidence-Gathering
At the UK House of Commons, evidence-gathering has been facilitated through powers to force individuals located in the UK to supply submissions (Rogers and Walters, 2004).  Furthermore, select committees have actively solicited evidence from civic society rather than only acting as passive receivers (Norton, 2013). Although neither ministers nor civil servants are covered by powers of compulsion, a prevalent politico-administrative atmosphere has generally ensured ministerial compliance (Norton, 2005).  Furthermore, civil servants have formal obligations to assist select committees. There have, however, been conflicts concerning the supply of official papers (Judge, 1992). 

These discussions have been echoed amongst wider scholarship. Hazan (2001: 44) noted that Dutch committees ‘had no formal right to compel individuals or officials to testify before them’. Similarly, McInnes (2005: 62) observed that a Canadian committee could not ‘enforce its summons on its own’. Alternatively, Wai-Man (2013) noted the ability to summon government officials in Hong Kong.   

Evaluation
There are four themes. The first theme is the availability of parliamentary research and clerking support. This issue generated criticism about facilities at the UK House of Commons (Newton, 2001). Similar resource deficiencies have been identified elsewhere, for example in Ireland (O’Halloran, 2010).  

The second theme is the skills-aptitudes of committee members, a factor identified in scholarship about the UK House of Commons concerning weaknesses in terms of subject specialism and general scrutiny skills, for example as oral interrogators (Jogerst, 1993).  Similar deficiencies have been identified, for example, concerning the Irish Parliament, where Martin (2010: 300) observed a ‘disinterest of committee members towards their role as …..scrutinisers’.  Explanations for skill-aptitude deficiencies among committee members have been specified in two additional factors – the workload of parliamentarians; and high levels of committee membership turnover.  Specifically, workload pressures have been associated with individual politicians serving on several committees contemporaneously, for example in Slovenia (Zajc, 2007). Regular committee membership turnover, and its alleged negative impact, has also been identified by scholars as a recurrent problem, for example concerning Israel (Hazan, 2001). 

The third theme, independence from the party whips is a significant issue. Overall, scholarship on the UK House of Commons has minimised the impact of direct influence through the party whips concerning factors like the evolving agenda and day-to-day deliberations (Drewry, 1985). There was, however, evidence that prior to the 2010 reforms, MPs had been removed from select committees as a consequence of their opinions and behaviour (HC 300, 2000). In some other institutions similar themes resonated more intently, for example Irish parliamentary committees are subject to a formal whipping system (Martin, 2010: 301). The  fourth theme, closely aligned with independence from the party machines, is whether practice follows the evidence-centric/bi-partisan norms experienced in contexts like the UK House of Commons (Rogers and Walters, 2004) and the Czech Republic (Linek and Mansfeldova, 2007) or whether much more partisan behaviour is recurrent. 

Outputs
The presence and desirability of the generation of publically available reports and recommendations has been a central theme of writings about the UK House of Commons select committees (Norton, 2005) and similar committees in other parliaments and assemblies, for example India  (Giri, 2005). Writers have also addressed the impact of committee reports and recommendations (Russell and Benton, 2011), although profound mythological difficulties with such analysis, particularly problems connecting causes and effects, mean that this aspect is omitted here. 


Bi-Constitutionalism
Bi-constitutionalism draws extensively on the work of Arend Lijphart, who placed democracies across a spectrum ranging from majoritarian (Westminster Model) to consensus (Lijphart, 1984, 1999).  Majoritarian systems were elitist, ‘based to some extent on mass-exclusion’ with ‘little emphasis on public participation’ (Flinders, 2010: 75).   Alternatively, the consensus model stressed values such as inclusion and participation (Flinders, 2010: 75).  These concepts were tested empirically by identifying independent variables (ten in the later 1999 version), grouped evenly into two dimensions (executive-parties and federal-unitary), which enabled the main democracies to be placed at specific points on a grid to generate a map of democracy (Lijphart, 1999). 
 
This analytical framework has been used as the starting point for a theoretical discussion of recent constitutional reform in the UK, specifically under New Labour governments (Flinders, 2005; Flinders and Curry, 2008; Flinders, 2009; Flinders, 2010).  A core distinction was made between scholars, such as Mair (2000), advocating the thesis that those reforms amounted to fundamental change, and others emphasising the continuities. The former view was taken, for example, by McDonald (2007: vii), who concluded that the election of New Labour has meant that ‘the British state has undergone radical change’ and that, as a consequence of this process, ‘the institutional architecture of the state’ has been ‘remodelled and the relationship between citizen and state refashioned’.  Alternatively, the latter position was encapsulated by Riddell (2000: 127), who commented that the ‘Blair government’s instincts have been gradualist and piecemeal, reforming the existing unitary state rather than creating a new constitution’.  Similarly, King (2007: 352) expressed scepticism about the extent to which New Labour shifted the constitution from a majoritarian to a consensual model, observing that the UK constitution ‘remains an essentially power-hoarding, or power-concentration constitution’. 

The bi-constitutionalism thesis uses Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) analysis to develop a synthesis of these two contrasting interpretations of recent constitutional reform in the UK.  The core argument is that there hasn’t been a clear transformation ‘from majoritarian power-hoarding to consensus power-sharing’ (Flinders, 2009: 653).  Alternatively, devolution, in particular, has led to the emergence of contrasting models at different levels and ‘a statecraft strategy based upon constitutional co-existence and the parallel operation of markedly different models of democracy within one polity’ (Flinders, 2009: 654).

This position was encapsulated by Flinders (2010: 280) who commented that: 

      New Labour (either by accident or design) sought to develop and institute
       a new meta-constitutional orientation at the sub-national and local levels
       based upon a more consensual and participatory model of democracy, 
       while maintaining (and defending) a quite different meta-consttitutional 
       orientation at the national level. 

New Labour appeared, therefore, to have decided that ‘a more pluralistic form of governance is appropriate at the devolved level, but not at the national level’ (Flinders 2010: 280) without offering a coherent explanation. 

The central relevance of bi-constitutionalism to devolution suggests, therefore, a useful theme through which to develop understanding of SP committee scrutiny, especially in view of the presence of similar structures at the UK House of Commons. Drawing on the model outlined by Lijphart (1984, 1999), this issue could be clearly addressed in terms of what Flinders (2010: 275) reconceptualised as the third variable - the relationship between executive and legislature. 

This theoretical and conceptual analysis thus suggests themes in terms of whether SP committee scrutiny might be viewed as reflective of a more consensual and participatory statecraft than that operational at the UK House of Commons. This is a research question of particular interest given the traditional intensive antipathy between Labour and the SNP (Hassan, 2009).  Specifically, the core issue is whether it might be identified as part of a distinctive set of legislative-executive relationships, characterised through a balance of power rather than a dominant executive.  This reasoning suggests two further research questions. The first is whether SP scrutiny committees were characterised by greater consensus and had a more participatory and inclusive atmosphere than at Westminster. The second question is whether they were a more effective mechanism through which to counteract executive power hoarding and thus create a genuine executive-legislative balance of power.  

Furthermore, the earlier discussion about the importance of evidence-centric approaches and building consensus amongst political opponents can be seen as a theme through which to add an overarching coherence to both research questions.  The core issue being that the evolution of consensual atmospheres and compromise among committee members is seen as crucial to generating reports and recommendations capable of shaping the public policy agenda and affecting governmental decisions. In other words, consensus-building on the committees is crucial to their impact on the legislature-executive balance. 

The application of bi-constitutionalism to SP committee scrutiny is also interesting in view of academic analysis interpreting the creation of the permanent structure of departmental-committees at the UK House of Commons, in 1979, as an adjustment to, or modification of, the Westminster model rather than a challenge to executive dominance.  This interpretation was, for example, advanced by Johnson (1988: 167), who viewed select committees as ‘regular interlocutors’ with departments and as significant institutions engaged in a continuous dialogue with their departments;  specifically, the absence of coercive capacity sustained executive dominance.  This scholarship suggests, therefore, a research theme in terms of whether devolution was more successful than the select committee reforms two decades earlier in shifting the executive-legislature balance and thus generating an outcome in accordance with the core bi-constitutionalism thesis.   

Existing research on the Scottish committees
Some of these themes have been echoed in existing scholarship and commentary on the Scottish committees. Regarding choice, scholars have, for example, discussed personnel selection. Arter (2004b: 59) noting that convenors were ‘appointed by the party leadership’.  Similarly, the Committee on Scottish Devolution (Calman, 2009) generated favourable conclusions about the existence of committees combining legislative and non-legislative scrutiny. 

Concerning evidence-gathering, Arter (2004a: 78) commented that committees were ‘at their most effective’ in gathering information.  Similarly, Davidson and Stark (2011) and McLaverty and MacLeod (2012) discussed initiatives to widen the range of individuals and organisations contributing evidence, although the extent of this innovation could be questioned, for example, as Davidson, Stark and Heggie (2011: 387) concluded, the use of deliberative forums like roundtable discussions still left MSPs ‘in charge of proceedings’.  

Scholarship about the  evaluation phase has addressed themes like impact arising from a high membership turnover (Arter, 2002).  Similarly, SP scholarship has considered workload issues, for example Mitchell (2010: 110-111) commented that ‘backbenchers serve on more than one committee and are overstretched’. Direct impacts from the traditional Labour-SNP antipathy (Hassan, 2009) can also be detected.  Specifically, scholars have noted significant limits on the tolerance of the whips for deviation from party positions and thus negative impacts on capacity to generate cross-party consensus (Arter, 2004a; Carman and Shephard, 2009).   Furthermore, Carman and Shephard (2009) also implied that the departure of Labour MSP Karen Gillon as Education Committee Convenor was linked to criticism of the Labour administration. Impacts from a much wider political partisanship, again located significantly in intensive SNP-Labour rivalry, were specified by Arter (2004b) concerning the first SP.  For example, he identified Labour perceptions that opposition MSPs used the committees as ‘pawns in the party political game’ (Arter, 2004b: 107) in relation to the full range of their committee activity. Specifically, experience on the Rural Development Committee was described as ‘a disaster from beginning to end’ in consequence of ‘political posturing’ (Arter, 2004b: 108). Although it was also argued that overall the committees were at their least partisan when undertaking ‘an in-depth inquiry’ (Arter, 2004b: 107).  

Scottish scholarship on the evaluation phase also coalesced around a theme seldom discussed elsewhere, whether committees met around the country. Initial analysis produced findings that meetings outside Edinburgh were ‘few and far between’ (Lynch 2001: 75). Subsequent study of the whole of the first Parliament indicated, however, that the committees became ‘increasingly peripatetic’ (Arter, 2004a: 79), there being 54 committee meetings outside the Scottish Parliament between 1999 and 2003. Although Arter (2006) subsequently questioned the extent to which these travels encouraged wider participation rather than more spectators. Concerning the outputs phase, Arter (2004a: 77) noted the ‘extensive inquiry work’ of the Scottish committees. 

Methods
Findings are obtained from two core sources. First, data is derived from documentary sources relating primarily to SP departmental subject committees, especially committee reports and minutes. Second, the analysis is supported through evidence from interviews with 15 MSPs (Conservative (3); Labour (4); Liberal Democrat (2): SNP (5); Green (1)), two committee officials and four committee witnesses undertaken in Scotland in 2009. Sessions with the MSPs addressed committee agendas, appointments, support for scrutiny, the presence or otherwise of a bi-partisan evidence-centric atmosphere, the aptitudes of committee members and committee powers and attitudes of witnesses. Discussions with officials covered many of the same issues, although (of course) circumvented the more politically sensitive elements, Witnesses were asked to discuss their specific experiences and to evaluate the process.

The analysis primarily used evidence from 2009. This timeframe was selected to reflect a period not interrupted by fundamental changes like a new government and to avoid atypical political and legislative characteristics associated with the run-in to an election. The timescale also reflected requirements to select a reasonably contemporary period. A longer timeframe was used, however, where a more substantive evidence base was required, where 2009 findings needed to be placed in context and in order to develop theoretical discussions. When census-type data was required, March 2011 was selected to produce contemporary findings from the end of the third SP.

 
Committee scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament
The departmental subject committees had responsibility for conducting a wide range of scrutiny concerning both legislation and wider issues. Furthermore, they took most clause-by-clause ‘committee stage’ legislative debates. In the third Parliament (2007-2011), there were seven departmental subject committees (Economy, Enterprise and Tourism; Education, Lifelong Learning and Culture; Health and Sport; Justice; Local Government and Communities; Rural Affairs and Environment;  Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change). 

 Choice
Overall, activity concerning non-legislative matters was quite modest. In 2009, the departmental subject committees completed just 11 significant inquiries not restricted to budgets or legislation – an average of 1.6 inquires per committee on.​[1]​ SP departmental subject committees had, however, a clear focus on primary legislation, holding 60 evidence sessions about 12 bills, an average of five sessions per bill in 2009. 

Furthermore, despite the emphasis on legislative scrutiny, the establishment of 
the SP increased substantially wider parliamentary scrutiny of Scotland’s 
government. Devolution, in 1999, led almost immediately to the creation of 12 
new committees with a significant scrutiny role​[2]​, which supplemented the 
continuing scrutiny role of the UK House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee. 
Analysis of alternative years across the first six years of the SP shows 
(see Table 1), however, that there were considerable variations in the number 
of inquiries and the number per committee was quite modest. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of the SP generated an immediate, significant and sustained 
increase in the volume of non-legislative inquiries producing reports 
and recommendations.  Thus although such work delivered by each



__________________________________________________________________
Table 1: Completed Non-legislative Inquiries from the Scottish Affairs Committee and SP Committee*

	Scottish Affairs Committee	Scottish Parliament Committees	Number of SP Committees	Inquiries per SP Committee
2005-2006	          3	         26	          13	          2.0
2003-2004	          2	         11	          13	          0.8
2001-2002	          5	         35	          14	          2.5
1999-2001	          1	         23	          12	          1.9
1998-1999	          2	          -	             -	            -
1997-1998	          2	          -	             -	            -

Note *Incorporates inquires generating reports and recommendations. It excludes  those concerned only with procedural matters, specific appointments or legislation but includes those concerned exclusively with budgetary scrutiny. Timeframes concern House of Commons sessions for the Scotish Affairs Committee and May-to-May years for SP Committees, reflecting the fixed May election date. Data is incorporated from all the relevant SP committees and is not confined to departmental committees.
________________________________________________________________
committee was on a modest scale, this analysis implies overall a transformational effect in terms of scale, specifically, reflecting the minimal level delivered previously. 

The extension of governmental scrutiny was referenced by an official, who commented that:

           Previously the Scottish Office operated in a vacuum and was largely 
            unscrutnised. Now it is scrutinised in a way that never happened 
            before.

As a witness from a government department observed, this increase in scrutiny eventually generated ‘a huge culture change’ among Scottish civil servants, ‘towards acceptance of intensified scrutiny’.

Nevertheless, this study supports findings of scholars such as Oyama (2003) concerning constraints arising from governmental agendas. As one MSP noted, the main restriction on committees’ capacity to determine their own agendas lay in ‘the government’s programme’. For example, in 2009, 147 (74 per cent) out of the 198 departmental subject committee sessions discussed items concerning government legislation. This analysis also reflects evidence from elsewhere (Robinson, 1985) that the objective of securing unanimous reports usually generated inquiries about issues of relatively modest political salience, where the intensity of the party political debate was diminished. In 2009 examples included child and adolescent mental health, equal pay in local government and the pig industry.  

Nevertheless, during the first two years of the third SP intensification of Labour-SNP antipathy (see below) led these committees to complete some inquiries about issues of intensive controversy between the political parties, which were conducted within a  highly confrontational atmosphere. As one MSP observed, a review of the central heating programme for those aged over 75 became a ‘straight party fight’ despite the existence of a widespread consensus that it was ‘hugely expensive, getting more expensive and not tackling fuel poverty’ (MSP). The core scrutiny issue was, as several interviewees observed, that Labour MSPs focused on defending a scheme introduced by their government rather than engaging in an evidence-centric process.  Overall, ’party politics got in the way of a proper debate about a difficult subject’ (MSP). 

Similarly, an inquiry about the planning process surrounding an application by Donald Trump to build a hotel and golf course in Aberdeenshire had an intensely partisan design and atmosphere focused on obtaining evidence of improper behaviour by the First Minister. This agenda was resented deeply by SNP members; one SNP MSP characterised these proceedings as a ‘show trial’, generating ‘nasty hearings’ and ‘innuendos’ that the ‘the First Minister was in some way behaving improperly’.   Unsurprisingly, the inquiry failed to reach a consensus and the final report was ‘laden with footnotes and dissenting paragraphs’ (SNP MSP) attached by SNP members.     

Furthermore, regarding the Education, Lifelong Learning and Culture Committee, which reflected the partisan atmosphere intently and where such attitudes lingered longer than most, the heightened political antipathy, primarily between Labour and the SNP, was reflected through a decision to ‘focus on taking oral evidence on specific policy issues rather than on undertaking inquiries’ (SP, 2011: 2). This decision reflected significantly ‘concern that members would struggle to agree a substantive report’ (MSP) and meant that in the 2007-2011 Parliament only one significant inquiry, complete with report recommendations, addressing a wider policy-administrative matter occurred. 

Although convenors were formally elected by their committees, there was a convention that party recommendations were not opposed. As one MSP commented, ‘in theory the committee votes to appoint the convenor, in reality there is agreement between the parties’. Party leaderships determined convenorships and which MSPs served on which committee through procedure analogous to that at the UK House of Commons prior to the current parliament and many other parliaments and assemblies (Llonszki, 2007).  

Evidence-gathering
The committees had powers to compel those summoned to attend and, thus, 
had stronger powers than in some compareable systems (Hazan, 2001).There 
were, however, important jurisdictional issues about geographical scope. The committees could not compel companies not registered in Scotland or individuals who were not living or working in Scotland to attend unless the session related clearly to the responsibilities of the Scottish Executive.  SP committees shared with their UK House of Commons counterparts (Norton, 2005) an inability to subpoena ministers; however, the politico-administrative culture restricted flexibility to timetabling. For example, a Conservative MSP noted that there could be:

      timetabling issues…a minister might say that they would rather come at a 
       Different time….they can negotiate about the timing of their appearance, 
       but a minister would not refuse to attent a Scottish Parliament committee.

Ministerial scrutiny was a recurrent and frequent characteristic of departmental subject committee evidence sessions.​[3]​ In 2009, cabinet and junior ministers​[4]​ appeared on 44 and 53 separate occasions respectively, although this activity had been accentuated by the political context of the timeframe.  This level could be explained, in part, through heightened partisanship, especially Labour-SNP antipathy, derived from the change in government. This theme was addressed by an SNP MSP (interviewed in July 2009), who argued that, in the first half of the third parliament, requests to appear before committees were sometimes ‘used to annoy ministers….opposition parties tried to drag ministers in front of committees as much as possible’.  This effect is illustrated in Table 2, which details the number of appearances made by cabinet and deputy ministers to give evidence to SP departmental subject committees in 2006, 2009 and 2012.   
_________________________________________________________________
Table 2: Ministerial Appearances at SP Departmental Subject Committee Evidence Sessions 
Year	 Cabinet Minister	  Deputy   Minister*	    Total	Committees	AppearancesCommittees
2006	       33	       37	       70	        8	     8.8
2009	       44	       53	       97	        7	   13.9
2012	       26	       33	       59	        6	     9.8

Note * Excludes law officers ________________________________________________________________

Overall, the quantitative findings from 2009 support the qualitative interview data and illustrate a much greater frequency of ministerial attendance during that timeframe, reflecting more requests to attend from the committees.  This conclusion can be strengthened through reference to ministerial appearances, during 2009, at six UK House of Commons select committees covering matters devolved in Scotland.  Overall, the number of such appearances at Westminster per committee averaged less than half the 2009 Holyrood level and disproportionately concerned junior ministers. The Westminster level was, however, closer to the SP average during the more typical years (see Table 3).
__________________________________________________________________
Table 3: House of Commons Select Committees in 2009
Committee	 Cabinet Ministerappearance	Junior Ministerappearance	TotalMinisterial appearances	Reports*
Children, Schools and Families	         4	       7	       11	       7
Culture, Media and Sport	         2	       2	         4	       5
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs	         1	       1	         2	       4
Health	         1	       6	         7	       5
Scottish Affairs	         1	       3	         4	       5
Transport	         3	       9	       12	       7

Note *Excludes procedural matters, appointments or legislative proposals, although reviews of  the operation of Acts are incorporated.        
_________________________________________________________________

While most witnesses welcomed the chance to give evidence, there were notable exceptions to this co-operative spirit. For example, Donald Trump’s company initially implied a refusal to give evidence, although they subsequently relented. There were also problems with regard to an inquiry about difficulties in the administration of the 2007 elections because DRS Data Services, which supplied the electronic equipment and was registered in England, refused to give oral evidence and was not obliged to attend because the relevant responsibilities had not been devolved to the Scottish Executive.  Occasional difficulties occurred concerning securing official information, for example in a Second SP Justice 1 Committee scrutiny about the Scottish Criminal Record Office.  


Evaluation
SP committees suffered from resource imbalances which are almost ingrained in committee scrutiny (Newton, 2001; O’Halloran, 2010). However, the resources available to these committees appeared to be particularly slender. For example, during the third SP departmental subject committees were each allocated approximately three or four dedicated staff. Alternatively, UK House of Commons select committees had seven or eight staff each.

The development of subject specialist expertise was fostered through absence of acute workload pressures; specifically the committee burden on MSPs was modest when compared to many other systems (Zajc, 2007).  At the end of the third SP in March 2011,  an analysis of the full range of SP committees showed that 64 MSPs had only one committee post, 25 MSPs served on two committees and one member sat on three committees. Excluding ministers, the Leaders of the three main opposition parties and the Presiding Officer, 20 MSPs had no committee positions, a cohort that included senior Labour MSPs like Andy Kerr and Jack McConnell.

There were, however, notable weaknesses in the scrutiny aptitudes of many MSPs, especially concerning questioning of witnesses.  One MSP commented on the frequency of ‘long rambling questions’ that facilitated evasive answers. Often committee members merely ‘read-out questions verbatim’ (official) from a list supplied by committee staff. This approach meant that those MSPs seldom undertook ‘their own preparatory work’ (MSP). 

 
A partial explanation for deficient subject-specific knowledge was identified through a high turnover of committee members, a theme that has been noted at other institutions (Hazan, 2001) and previous SPs (Arter, 2002). Although five of the seven initial convenors remained throughout the third SP, only 45% of committee members served on the same departmental subject committee throughout the whole parliament.  The negative impact of these turnover rates was mentioned by several MSPs. For example, one politician observed that ‘many members did not serve long enough to obtain a meaningful depth of subject-specific expertise’ and thus ‘many colleagues struggled with aspects of the brief’. 

Requirements to construct reports and recommendations on an evidence basis, and to secure cross-party agreement, to ensure credibility meant that some activity during the evaluation phase reflected the evidence-centric consensual norms identified earlier (Rogers and Walters, 2004). This approach was noted by a one Labour convenor, who commented that s/he ‘looks to the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and SNP members’ because committee reports must ‘be achieved by consensus and reflect the evidence that you receive’.  

There was, however, significant evidence of impacts from partisan political 
differences on behaviour. The central theme was that non-legislative 
committee scrutiny reflected Labour-SNP antipathy to a degree that 
significantly exceeded effects from the overarching government-opposition 
rivalry on the work of the UK House of Commons Select committees. This 
theme, which has been referenced in previous scholarhip (Carman and 
Shepard, 2009), was alluded to by one minister.  S/he asserted, for example, 
that often when cross-examining ministers’ the primary aim of some 
opposition committee members appeared to be to embarrass them rather 
than discuss the subject matter in hand’. 

As noted earlier, the partisan elements of this atmosphere were intensified significantly during the first two years of the third SP (2007-9).  As one MSP commented, ‘recurrent partisan tension between Labour and SNP members, which exceeds that between government and opposition MPs at Westminster……..became much more intensive after the SNP assumed office’. This theme was addressed by a committee witness, who observed that:  

          ex-ministers were dumped on committees…they wanted to lash out…
           there was a personal reaction which caused this partisanship….the Trump 
           inquiry was a classic example.
       
Similarly, one MSP interpreted committee scrutiny during the period 2007-9 as reflecting the fact that ‘they (Labour) were angry’ and so ‘went on the party political attack all the time’. Similarly, an official commented that ‘in the first half of this Parliament the committees became more adversarial and less constructive’. It was also suggested that intensive antipathy towards the SNP administration was reflected in the attitudes of ‘some Liberal Democrats…who were suffering from the dislocation of loss of office’ (SNP MSP).  In particular, a former SNP minister observed that political partisanship often drove opposition scrutinisers to ‘miss huge areas of legitimate examination because they were focused on party political points’.  

This intensified partisanship was also reflected in the behaviour of SNP MSPs 
who were restrained by the imperative for the first SNP government to succeed 
and thus behaved more frequently as ‘government advocates on committees’ 
(MSP). As one SNP MSP observed: ‘You wouldn’t expect two years into the first 
ever Scottish National Party government to have SNP backbenchers focused on 
critically holding them to account’.

By late 2009, however, much of the heightened intensity of partisanship generated through the 2007 election result had subsided. As one MSP noted, ‘the atmosphere on virtually all the committees now broadly resembles that in the first two parliaments’.  Specifically, no more deeply divisive inquiries like those on the Trump planning application or the heating scheme for those aged over 75 were established.  As has already been noted, however, and as reflected by one SNP MSP:
 
         ‘although committees are typically more consensual forums than 
          plenary, since inception, the intensive rivalry between Labour and the 
          SNP has meant that their atmosphere can be much more partisan in 
          comparison to similar activity undertaken by the Westminster select 
          committees. With politicians more inclined to push arguments or 
          agendas as part of wider political debate’.

Diminution of partisan behaviour roughly to previous levels meant, therefore, committee scrutiny operational within a more partisan atmosphere than that experienced at Westminster. 

Nevertheless, with the possible exception of Karen Gillion, convenors appeared not to have been removed as a consequence of being too critical of party policies and have enjoyed effective security of tenure, the majority serving throughout the Parliament. As one convenor commented, ‘once you are a convenor of a committee, it is very difficult for a whip to say you are no longer a convenor of a committee’. As at the UK House of Commons (HC 300, 2000), and reflected in previous SP scholarship (Carman and Shephard, 2009), departures of specific MSPs from committees could occasionally be explained through removal by the whips for deviating too far from their party leadership. For example, one MSP commented that ‘the abrupt departure of a member of my committee coincided with criticism of their party’s agenda’. 

In the 2007-11 timeframe, SP committees held 21 formal meetings away from the Parliament, a much lower total than held during the first SP (Arter, 2004a), which suggested declining enthusiasm for this innovation. Furthermore, only 11 of the meetings were held by a departmental subject committee. This diminished enthusiasm reflected, for example, practice at the UK House of Commons. In 2009, apart from a Scottish Affairs Committee session held in Glasgow, none of the six select committees mentioned in Table 3 held a formal meeting away from the UK Parliament. 


Outputs
The extensive legislative functions of the departmental subject committees meant a significant output of reports about legislative scrutiny, 63 reports being published in 2009. In consequence, there was a limited output of reports about wider inquiries. Eleven such reports were produced in 2009. Furthermore, analysis of a range of comparator years implied a roughly constant output level (see Table 4), which appeared to be substantially below that of the UK House of Commons select committees (see Table 3).
__________________________________________________________________


Table 4:  Non-Legislative Inquiries* completed by SP-Departmental Committees
Year	Reports	Committees	Reports per committee
2006	    9	       8	     1.1
2008	    8	       7	     1.1
2009	  11  	       7	     1.6
2010	  12	       7	     1.7
2012	    9	       6	     1.5

Note * Excludes activity reviews and those exclusively about budgets, although it includes a report about NHS Board revenue allocations, which was slightly wider in remit. It also reflects the absence of reports about specific appointments.
_______________________________________________________________


Towards a bi-constitutional committee scrutiny perspective
Here, findings about SP committee scrutiny are related to the bi-constitutional 
thesis, which is subsequently qualified and developed. This is undertaken 
through two themes – the extent to which SP committees reflected a 
consensual power-sharing approach to committee scrutiny; and their capacity 
to challenge executive power-hoarding.



Committee consensus
The practice of SP committee scrutiny discussed here reflected, in part at least, wider evidence-centric norms, incorporating diminished partisanship and non-legislative agendas primarily away from the epicentre of political conflict, although there has also  long been evidence of a much more partisan aspect to this scrutiny than generated, for example, through the UK House of Commons select committees. An atmosphere reflective, in particular, of the traditional Labour-SNP antipathy. 

Evidence from 2007-9 indicates that such SP committee scrutiny has a much weaker capacity, than that of the UK House of Commons select committees, to insulate itself from a wider intensification of party-political conflict. Specifically, the intensification of the antipathy between the SNP and Labour. For approximately two years after May  2007, committee scrutiny thus acquired a more partisan culture, effectively becoming a short-medium term conduit for shifts in the wider political atmosphere resulting from the establishment of the first SNP government. Impacts arose, for example, through the choice of some agendas to make wider partisan political points rather than develop an evidence-centric bi-partisan contribution; and increasing requests to question ministers, arising from aims to intensify broader political pressure on the new regime. Similarly the dearth of inquiries undertaken by the Education, Lifelong Learning and Culture Committee reflected problems of agreeing cross-party agendas; while there was evidence of individual MSPs adopting more partisan attitudes when undertaking committee work, for example when cross-examining ministers. 

Finally, diminishing enthusiasm for holding formal sessions beyond the Parliament implies a weakened focus on the wider participatory elements of a consensual approach to committee scrutiny, although such an interpretation might be challenged in terms of scepticism that shifting venues enhanced participation (Arter, 2006).

Challenging Executive Power-Hoarding 
The substantive increase in committee scrutiny and the consequential cultural shift within Scottish government towards accountability and scrutiny derived from the establishment of devolved institutions, supports a radical interpretation of New Labour’s constitutional reform agenda.  Creation of the devolved institutions can, therefore, be interpreted as part of a clear assault on power-hoarding exercised at the Scottish Office before 1999.  This observation answers, however, a slightly different research question to the one posed earlier - whether reform altered the extent of executive power-hoarding in Scotland, not whether it created a significant contrast with overall performance at Westminster. 

Alternatively, when compared to the select committees of the UK House of Commons, these findings can be interpreted as more reflective of the sceptical view. Specifically, SP departmental subject committees share many select committee characteristics limiting capacity to challenge the executive. These include an absence of coercive powers to enforce change, deficiencies in the scrutiny-skills of committee members; and sparse resourcing. Furthermore, identification of a group of distinctive features, in comparison with the select committees, that weakens further capacity to challenge executive power-hoarding suggests a form of bi-constitutionalism differing from that identified by Flinders (2010).  Precisely, SP committee scrutiny can be interpreted as closer to the majoritarian power-hoarding model than that practiced at the UK House of 
Commons.

First, the amalgamation of legislative and non-legislative scrutiny meant that there was substantive ‘crowding-out’ of non-legislative by legislative scrutiny. There was, therefore, diminished capacity to challenge the administration and policy agendas of the Scottish government not directly associated with legislative proposals. Second, retention of the traditional patronage-based appointments model suggests unwillingness to adopt a key UK House of Commons select committee reform acknowledged to have helped to increase capacity to challenge executive
power-hoarding.  

Third, evidence of heightened partisanship arising significantly from intensive Labour-SNP rivalry, especially during the 2007-9 timeframe, implies weakening of the  evidence-centric consensual approach thought crucial for influence and thus to challenge executive power-hoarding. Furthermore, it also implies that this capacity to challenge executive power-hoarding is acutely vulnerable to shifts in the overarching political atmosphere, specifically the Labour-SNP relationship. In any case, this scholarship and previous analysis also suggests that since establishment SP committee scrutiny has operated within a diminished evidence-centric context when compared with that practiced at Westminster.

Fourth, difficulties about securing evidence concerning the 2007 elections showed the territorial constraints on committee scrutiny.  Effectively, capacity to challenge executive-power hoarding was constrained by the complex minutiae of the devolution settlement and tight territorial constraints which increased the probability that significant witnesses would be based beyond the geographic jurisdiction of those committees.  

Alternatively, increased ministerial evidence sessions during 2007-9 could be interpreted as evidence of heightened capacity to challenge executive power-hoarding through more regular scrutiny, although this effect was short-term (see Table 2). Furthermore, overall, this increase did not reflect greater emphasis on carefully constructed forensic evidence-centric critiques of governmental agendas or decisions but rather attempts to score political points, influence the wider party political competition and pressurise new ministers. This is hardly evidence of the consensual model. 

Although differing significantly with the model outlined by Flinders (2010), this specification of a more majoritarian form of committee scrutiny does, however, 
stress the core strength of the bi-constitutional thesis – identification of 
contrasts in terms of majoritarian or consensual models of government across 
the nations of the UK.

From a Bi to a Multi-Constitutional Analysis of Committee Scrutiny  
This latter observation about relevance of the bi-constitutionalism thesis can be developed and qualified with reference to committee scrutinyy undertaken at the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) and the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), which were the subject of separate studies undertaken as part of a wider project about comparative scrutiny across the parliaments and assemblies of the UK (Cole and McAllister, forthcoming).  Specifically, committee scrutiny at the NAfW reflected the initial bi-constitutional thesis more precisely than SP committee scrutiny. At the NAfW, committees were characterised by a pervasive consensual focus that drew on a quite bi-partisan wider political culture at the assembly (Melding, 2003). This atmosphere generated a relatively large quantity of inquiries. For example, in 2009, the four departmental scrutiny committees and one departmental scrutiny sub-committees published a combined total of 27 reports about substantial policy matters. 

This observation also shows an interesting contrast to the SP. At the NAfW, the traditional Labour-Plaid Cymru antipathy had been diminished through factors such as a commitment to justify and strengthen the new institution, in the context of some public scepticism, and the impact of contemporary sharing power in the One Wales Coalition (2007-11).  Furthermore, this output reflected the split between legislative and non-legislative scrutiny, and thus the absence of the ‘crowing-out’ effect identified at the SP, although this arrangement ceased in June 2011, with the amalgamation of NAfW departmental and legislation committees. 

Alternatively, at the NIA intensive antipathy between nationalist and unionist politicians associated with sectarianism affected committee scrutiny through, in particular, a substantial diminution of the scale scope of non-legislative inquiries (Cole and McAlli
ster, forthcoming). Similarly, a strong focus on regular scrutiny of departmental officials in seminar-style formats might be traced, partly, to specific obligations to advise and assist ministers (Cole and McAllister, forthcoming), rather than an emphasis on challenging executive power-hoarding. 

This analysis of committee scrutiny SP, and also the references to a much wider research project about UK scrutiny, can, therefore, be interpreted through the emergence of complex and contrasting institutional arrangements, there being significant variations concerning the degree to which structures across the parliaments and assemblies of the UK conform to a majoritarian or a consensual model.  New Labour’s constitutional reforms, coupled with the distinctive devolution process in Northern Ireland, have, therefore, perhaps led to the evolution of a multi-constitutional model. Different styles and attitudes towards challenging executive power-hoarding tendencies having evolved in different territories.

These findings about one aspect of the devolved settlement have much wider implications for how devolution in the UK is interpreted.  Particularly, they suggest a more extensive research agenda to map core elements of the evolving government of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland within the context of the bi-constitutional/multi-constitutional thesis. The central theme being to address the question of to what extent, and how, institutions in the four territories relate to majoritarian or consensual frameworks.   Furthermore, this analysis suggests a substantive comparative research agenda through which scholars could compare regional and state governmental institutions with national ones in relation to the two models. 
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